Monthly Archives: December 2025

Sir Shafaat Ahmed’s Brief Pre-Independence Political Career Has Lessons for Contemporary India

Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh / BRITISH INDIA :

Muslims not affiliated to political parties have very little chance of making it to public life.

Sir Shafaat Ahmed (left) in Egypt with Jinnah and his sister Fatima.

On September 2, 1946, members of the Interim Government took oath in Delhi. The Interim Government was formed to facilitate the transfer of power from the British to Indians, and consisted entirely of Indians, except for the Viceroy and the commander-in-chief. The plan was for it to have a total of 14 members which was to include five Hindus, five Muslims, and one member each from the Scheduled Caste, Parsi, Sikh and Christian communities, but before it finally took office, there was much debate and politicking, some of its acrimonious, about its composition and structure.

Only 12 positions were finally filled: Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalchari, Sarat Chandra Bose, Dr John Matthai, Sardar Baldev Singh, Jagjivan Ram, C.H. Bhabha, Asaf Ali, Syed Ali Zaheer and Sir Shafaat Ahmed. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who had broken away from the Congress, stayed away as he wanted the Muslim members to be only from the Muslim League. One of the names he objected to was that of Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan, a scholar politician.

His appointment offers an example of how to the political trajectory of ‘independent’ – i.e. non-politically affiliated – Muslims in India has been fraught with strife.

The inclusion of these three Muslims undermined Jinnah’s constant demand that all Muslim members of the Interim Government should be from the League. “The Viceroy only added insult to injury by nominating three Muslims who, he knows, do not command either the respect or the confidence of Muslim India,” said Jinnah after Viceroy Wavell’s announcement. The inclusion of Sir Shafaat had particularly riled the Muslim League because he had left it over fundamental differences. While in the League, he had defended it publicly but also disagreed on many issues – the final parting came when the League asked that titles given by the British be returned, and Sir Shafaat disagreed strongly.

On the evening of August 24, 1946, as Sir Shafaat was returning from his walk, he was attacked by two youngsters near Darbhanga House (which now houses a school) in Shimla. He received deep wounds on his head, chest and neck. The incident happened just a few hours after Wavell announced on radio that Sir Shafaat would be a member of the Executive Council. This was a rare and outrageous physical attack on a high-ranking Muslim, and is also a telling statement on the precarious position of the independent Muslim.

Jinnah’s notion of non-League Muslim leaders as lacking respect among Muslims was central to his self-declared position as the sole spokesman of the community. He also argued that even the Congress be not allowed to nominate a Muslim, a condition that was never accepted by the British. The attack on Sir Shafaat Ahmed was reflective of the rather restricted space in the political firmament for Muslims who were not in either the Congress or the Muslim League camp. Two more Muslim leaders could have been inducted in the Interim Government (to take the total number of Muslims to five), but the questions of acceptability and legitimacy of any non-League, non-Congress Muslim prevented that.

‘Congress Moslem’

Reporting on the tussle over the composition of the Interim Government, newspaper reports would describe the Muslim members as either “Congress Moslem”, “non-League Moslem”. For, as the formation of the Interim Government shows, there was hardly any scope for the ‘Muslim’ equivalent of a C.H. Bhabha, who was a businessman, or the Sikh leader Sardar Baldev Singh, both independent of political affiliations, a situation which continues even now.

Discussing the problems facing the composition of the Executive Council with Leo Amery, the secretary of state for India, Viceroy Wavell on June 20, 1945 wrote from Delhi: “The main difficulty is likely to arise over non-League Moslems if Congress insist on putting forward Moslem names. There would also be difficulty in inclusion of non-League non-Congress Moslems.” This is very similar to independent Muslim political actors/formations, not aligned with big parties, struggling to gain legitimacy or patronage.

Sir Shafaat’s inclusion may indicate that there was a scope for a non-Congress non-League Muslim, but it was predicated by the non-participation of Jinnah’s League. On October 26, 1946, three members – Sarat Bose, Sir Shafaat and Syed Zaheer – resigned to make way for the Muslim League, after Jinnah agreed to join the Interim Government.

This brief elevation to a top public office was the highpoint in the political career of Sir Shafaat. In January 1947, there were talks of appointing him as India’s high commissioner to Canada, but it never happened. He had been a member of the UP Legislative Council in the 1920s, part of the Muslim delegation to the Round Table conference and also was India’s high commissioner to South Africa from 1941 to 1944.

Sir Shafaat’s entry to politics was through academia, and not through the popular routes of law or journalism. He is perhaps best remembered as a historian who played a role in the establishment of the Indian History Congress and presided over its first meeting in June 1935 in Pune. As chairman of the Modern Indian History at University of Allahabad he started the Journal of Indian History in 1924. He also taught at University of Madras and Aligarh Muslim University.

He died in Shimla in July 1947, having fallen ill two months earlier. Reporting his death the Congress-supporting Bombay Chronicle noted: “During the greater part of his public career, Dr Shafaat Ahmed Khan, an eminent professor of History and a politician, belonged to a school of thought and activity which quite rightly did not find favour with nationalist India and the Congress. That is why the news of his inclusion in the first Interim Cabinet was received with surprise rather than satisfaction.”

This characterisation of his appointment by the Bombay Chronicle as a “surprise rather than satisfaction” was at odds with the official Congress stand, but was still more charitable than the views of those who placed a greater importance on the joint participation of the Congress and the League in the Interim government. Reflective of the wider mood of the period, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, for example, termed Sir Shafaat’s inclusion as “unfortunate” and “provocative” to the Muslim League, signifying that the idea of a representative national government during the high politics of Partition could only include Muslims from the League and the Congress.

Muslim representation today

It is only in retrospect that we can assess the figure of Sir Shafaat in the context of the idea of Muslim representation, which requires moving away from the dominant narratives of Congress-Muslim League matrix in the years leading to Partition. It seems that the restrictive bracketing of the nature of Muslim representation is not new, and has a tradition of being inherently inimical to independent voices and movements. It has now taken a much uglier turn.

In colonial India, there was a strong Muslim political presence in Punjab and Bengal, which has continued post-Independence in the form of IUML, MIM and other regional parties. But the story of the national level since then has been different. In independent India, Muslims voted largely for the Congress, which also gave a platform to community leaders. But now with the Congress’s electoral losses, the political sphere has shrunk.

In the current Lok Sabha (like the previous one) too, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) does not have a single Muslim. As the dominant political party, this situation raises a larger existential question on the conception of a Muslim politician itself.

The recent rhetoric of ‘UPSC jihad’, implying the infiltration of the civil services by Muslims, further shows the discomfort in certain sections of the Indian society over Muslims holding positions in public life. Whether it is bureaucracy or politics, it is clear that a narrative of hate and fear, driven by a dangerous construction of undesirability of Muslims in high offices seems to be the driving impulse.

The percentage of Muslim bureaucrats in India has been historically low, and the community’s shrinking political representation in Parliament brings to focus the vexed issue of Muslim representation and shows that walking the political terrain for Muslims has been difficult without patronage from established parties.

Danish Khan is a UK-based journalist and a doctoral candidate at University of Oxford.   

source: http://www.thewire.in / The Wire / Home> Analysis> History / by Danish Khan / September 02nd, 2020

Married off at 14, Binziya’s search for self-respect drives pursuit of learning

Malappuram, KERALA :

Binziya was forced to abandon her studies when her family arranged her marriage in 1997.

Malappuram :

Married off at 14, confined within domestic boundaries for decades, and once ashamed to admit she had studied only up to Class 9, a woman from Malappuram has now rewritten her destiny through education. After 29 years of marriage, Makkaraparambha native Binziya has emerged with a postgraduate degree in psychology, proving that dreams delayed are never dreams denied.

Binziya was forced to abandon her studies when her family arranged her marriage in 1997. One year later, she became a mother. As the eldest daughter-in-law in a large joint family, she was tasked with looking after her husband’s younger siblings and managing all household responsibilities.

“I was still a child. But I had to act like a grown woman because everyone expected me to be one,” she recalls. Education became a distant memory as cooking, cleaning and childcare took over her life. “There was no space for my wishes. My daughter and later my son became my world. But deep inside, I always missed learning.”

A turning point came when the family shifted to their own home. She came to know about the government’s literacy mission and decided to ask her husband if she could attempt the Class 10 equivalency examination. “My husband supported me without hesitation. When I passed with good marks, I cried. I felt alive again,” she says. She went on to complete her higher secondary education next before enrolling for a BA English programme through distance education in 2020.

But her heart was always set on psychology. “I have gone through many emotional struggles in life. Who understands pain better than a woman? I wanted to learn psychology so that I could help others like me,” she says.

The biggest driving force behind her educational pursuit was her own self-respect. “Whenever someone asked me how much I had studied, I felt ashamed to say Class 9. That shame pushed me to continue learning. I wanted to feel proud of myself,” she explains.

Her years of effort finally came to fruition as she completed her MA in psychology. Binziya says she hopes her story encourages other women who were denied opportunities. “There are many women like me in Malappuram who are married off too early and remain confined to their homes. I want them to know that education is still possible.”

She is also proud of the change within her own family. “My daughter completed her Plus-II before marriage. She has finished her degree and is preparing for postgraduate studies. It makes me happy that she will not have to carry the same regrets I once had.”

Binziya now dreams of becoming a practising psychologist and providing support to homemakers who struggle.

source: http://www.newindianexpress.com / The New Indian Express / Home> Kerala / by Lakshmi Athira / November 28th, 2025

Vizag professor develops sensor-based Braille learning device to help visually impaired children learn

Vizag, ANDHRA PRADESH :

The device includes a ‘Help Me’ button that alerts the teacher whenever a student needs intervention, improving classroom management.

Mohammed Khwaja Muinuddin Chisti, Assistant Professor in the Department of EECE from GITAM Deemed to be University, has developed an embedded Braille Learning Assistant Embedded Kit (LAEK).Photo | G Satyanarayana

Visakhapatnam :

For many visually impaired children, the journey to literacy begins with the touch of a fingertip. But mastering Braille is often a slow and demanding process that requires constant one-on-one support from teachers, a challenge in schools where trained instructors are scarce and classrooms are full. For families living far from specialised schools, opportunities are even fewer, leaving children dependent on others for even the basics of reading and communication.

A faculty member at GITAM Deemed to be University, Visakhapatnam, is hoping to change that. Mohammed Khwaja Muinuddin Chisti, Assistant Professor in the Department of EECE, has developed an embedded Braille Learning Assistant Embedded Kit (LAEK), a simple, sensor-based device that allows visually impaired children to learn Braille independently, either at home or in school.

The device is a 3 × 2 hollow hemispherical Braille cell fitted with sensors that identify the dot patterns placed by the student. Once the pattern is detected, the system decodes it and provides audio feedback by announcing the corresponding letter, number or instruction. This makes it possible for students to practise and revise lessons without waiting for a teacher to guide every step. “In many schools, one teacher has to train 30 or 40 visually impaired children, and each child needs personal attention for Braille practice,” Chisti remarked, adding, “Many students hesitate to ask the same doubt again. I wanted to create something that lets them learn comfortably at their own pace.”

The device includes a ‘Help Me’ button that alerts the teacher whenever a student needs intervention, improving classroom management. The balls used to form patterns are designed to stay within reach even if dropped, and the device is chargeable, eliminating the difficulty of replacing batteries.

“The tool is also aimed at children who cannot attend blind schools due to distance or lack of accessibility. Parents can guide their child’s learning at home using the same pattern-based method followed in classrooms. Depending on the child’s learning ability, all basic Braille alphabets can be learnt within a few weeks,” Chisti stated.

Before developing this tool, Chisti created a ‘Walking Assistant’ device, a wearable tool that alerts visually impaired users about obstacles through vibrations and sound. His interactions with students and teachers during that project sparked the idea for a more focused educational device.

“When I visited blind schools to donate the walking aids, I saw the kind of effort teachers put in, and how much time it takes for each child to grasp Braille,” he said.

“I felt technology could ease that pressure and help children become confident, independent learners.”

The new learning assistant has been filed for patent registration. Chisti hopes to manufacture and distribute multiple units to blind schools using research grants and donor support.

Future upgrades may include computer vision and speech recognition to help students identify people around them and navigate with greater confidence.

source: http://www.newindianexpress.com / The New Indian Express / Home> Good News / by Usha Peri / November 30th, 2025

What Indian Cities Owe to Islam

INDIA :

The cities created in the Deccan by Muslim leaders introduced the concept of public space to the Indian world. 

Photograph of Aurangabad from the Allardyce Collection: Album of views and portraits in Berar and Hyderabad, taken by an unknown photographer in the 1860s. This view is of the Kham River, the city lies along its right bank. Photo: Public domain/Wikipedia.

When India specialists examine what Islam has brought to the country, they often focus on cultural aspects such as language, poetry, music, painting, culinary arts, or spirituality. They rarely consider the urban dimension. 

Certainly, historians and geographers readily examine how what the Marçais brothers called “the Islamic city” spread throughout India, but mainly to see it as an exogenous institution, even an enclave sheltering an elite that came from outside and was cut off from society. Pratyush Shankar’s recent book covers this dimension, of course, but goes further.

In History of Urban Form of India, a work based on the analysis of 42 Indian cities, the author distinguishes three types of cities – which form the three parts of the book: ancient cities, medieval cities, and cities produced by the modern state.

Ancient cities, apart from those of the Indus civilisation, are mainly epitomised in the “temple cities” of southern India. While medieval cities follow several different patterns, Pratyush Shankar distinguishes above all between merchant cities – typical of Gujarat – those of the Himalayas (whose form is conditioned by the terrain), and those built by Muslims in the Deccan.

Comparing them proves very useful in understanding Islam’s contribution to the Indian civilisation – something Pratyush Shankar helps us to do, without attempting it himself – thanks to his morphological approach to the city: he is interested only in the form of the city, not in its local mode of governance or its relationship with the state.  

All Indian cities inherited a significant part of their form or structure from the caste system. Pratyush Shankar points out in the introduction that the “Caste system had a huge impact in determining the location and formation of neighbourhood clusters that were inward looking (in cases of Jodhpur and Udaipur) and the possibility to shut off from the city by controlling the gates (Pols of Ahmedabad)”. 

History of Urban Form of IndiaFrom Beginning till 1900’s, Pratyush Shankar, OUP, 2024.

The caste logic is naturally at work in the “temple city”:

“The idea of using a Brahmin settlement (with a temple) for creating a surplus economy was central to the birth of cities in South India. This was legitimized through the Brahminical ideology of the Brahmin-Kshatriya coalition expressed through Vedic and puranic religion”.

And naturally, the “temple city” is “divided into various sectors based on function differentiation that was represented through various caste-based housing. The caste system was strictly observed and manifested itself in the planning of these urban centers”.

The cities built by Muslim leaders from the 14th century onwards in the Deccan did not escape the caste system – especially since distinguishing between Hindu and Islamic cities constitutes “a very simplistic binary” that does not reflect a much more complex reality. But these medieval cities of the Deccan added something new to the urban form that had prevailed in the country until then. This innovation did not take place within the city, but outside – and still, that was a key element of the city dynamics: not far from the city walls, but well outside the city itself, Sufi saints settled in an almost systematic manner. They deliberately distanced themselves from the city to show their detachment from material things and live in peace. At the same time, the inhabitants revered them: “People would leave the material city behind to spend a day at the sacred Sufi sites and return by evening”. 

After their death, these saints were buried in the very place where they stood, and a mausoleum called “Dargah” was built around their tomb, the size of which varied according to the popularity of the saint. 

What Pratyush Shankar does not say is that throughout society, Sufi saints were attributed with considerable powers, even beyond death: many devotees continued to visit the Dargah centuries after the saint’s death to ask him to grant their wishes (whether it be to have a child, to be cured of an illness, or to pass exams). This votive logic, due to its transactional nature, transcends social barriers of all kinds: Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, etc. worship Sufi saints, people from all walks of life, from the elite to the lower castes, rub shoulders at the Dargah and, finally, even in the Holy of Holies, women and men are admitted on an equal footing. But Pratyush Shankar assumes that the reader what I have mentioned above when he concludes:

“The unique contribution of the Deccan cities was perhaps not so much in any extraordinary formation within, but rather in the development of the prominent district of the Sufi saints and the suburbs. Sufi saints were popular amongst the masses and provided the much-needed counterpoint to the state. If the city represented the material world of trade, commerce, and power, the suburban precincts of Sufi tombs were just the opposite; a sacred and spiritual space with frugal infrastructure which is out there in the lap of nature. Over the centuries, this typology took firm root as these complexes of tombs became public places that were frequented by city dwellers like a pilgrimage out of the city, as they often lay just outside the fort walls of the city”.

The word is out: “public space”!

The cities created in the Deccan by Muslim leaders in the 14th century introduced the concept of public space to the Indian world, which had ignored  it until then due to the deep cleavages that divided society along lines of religion, caste, and gender. This is a contribution of Islam to India that some would call paradoxical, given that the image of this religion, today, is often dominated by the idea of segregation, even exclusion. But before Islam entered India, such open spaces did not exist in the country. 

View of the Feroz Shah Kotla, Delhi, 1830, 1843 (oil on canvas) by Colonel Robert Smith (fl.1880-90). Photo: Wikimedia Commons.

Certainly, ascetics established their ashrams out of cities – like Ramana Maharshi’s cave above Tiruvannamalai – but his followers did not disturb him there, and when they did, they interacted with him on the mode of the guru-shishya parampara, whereas around the Dargah, one would find play grounds as well as picnic sites.   

In his book, Pratyush Shankar confines this contribution to the Deccan, but it is tempting to argue that the innovation he points to can be found throughout India. In the north too, Sufi saints settled on the outskirts of cities  – did Nizamuddin not choose to live far from Delhi?  – and their mausoleums still offer the image of a public space open to all. This is even more striking when the Dargah is still surrounded by greenery, even though it has been incorporated into the city, such as Sarkhej Roza in Ahmedabad or Feroz Shah Kotla in Delhi, where Anand Taneja has clearly shown that people from all walks of life still gather today, as befits a public space!                    

Christophe Jaffrelot is Senior Research Fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, Professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King’s College London, Non resident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chair of the British Association for South Asian Studies.

source: http://www.thewire.in / The Wire / Home> English> Opinion> Urban / by Christophe Jaffrelot / October 18th, 2025

When Gujarat’s Kachchhi Traders Had the World in Their Palms

GUJARAT :

By recreating a whole world around a group of traders in western India, Chhaya Goswami’s Globalization before Its Time is business history as it should be.

A Dutch trading ship from the late 17th-century. Credit: Wikimedia

The Arabian Sea has a special place in Indian business history. For centuries the cities and settlements on the Arabian Sea littoral traded with each other, exchanging Indian textiles for horse, armaments, pearls and ivory. In turn, some of the textiles were passed on to the Atlantic slave trade in Africa as a medium of exchange, or sent overland to European markets. Coastal merchants indigenous to the region bordering the sea engaged in this business and developed sophisticated systems of banking and shipbuilding to support the mercantile enterprise. The Hindu and Muslim traders of Kachchh were examples of such groups of people.

In the 17th century, the Arabian Sea trade flourished thanks to the control that three powerful empires – the Ottoman in Turkey, the Safavid in Iran and the Mughal in India – exercised on some of the key seaports, and regular transactions amongst them. This was also the time when the European merchant companies established themselves in the Indian Ocean trade, even though the Portuguese had arrived in this world somewhat earlier. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Mughal empire had almost collapsed and its access to the Arabian Sea ports had long come to an end. Europeans were in the ascendance.

What happened to the indigenous traders and bankers during this period of transition? Two contending stories exist on this question. The first says that they lost ground to the Europeans while their patrons lost political power. The second says that the indigenous traders found partnerships and agency with the Europeans lucrative, and as their fortunes flourished, the Europeans gained in political power. Both stories overstate the Europeans’ commercial prowess and understate the Indians’ capacity to shape the course of history.

Chhaya Goswami’s book is a corrective to such biased histories. It shows that the Kachchhi traders did gain from European trade, and withstood well the decline of empires, but they could do so thanks to their own resources, which included well-developed institutions of commerce and banking, knowledge of the seas, shipping, and shipbuilding, past history of collaborating with political actors, and access to both maritime and overland trading routes.

The book is divided into four chapters, each one of substantial length. Chapter one explores the special characteristics of Kachchh that make it a “land of entrepreneurs”. Chapters two and three describe Kachchhi traders’ activities in Muscat and Zanzibar respectively, and chapter four deals with some of the prominent firms in the maritime trade, and how a few of them extended their operations beyond the southwest Asia region.

Why Kachchh? What is special about the region that it should produce so many merchant groups? The convenient location of the region on a navigable part of the eastern Arabian Sea, as well as the Mandvi port, of course, supplies a part of the answer.

Another part of the answer has to do with politics. The western coastal regions were ruled by small states that depended heavily on income from trade. This dependence was due to the poor agricultural conditions in the region. In turn, these states, though nominally vassals of the Mughals, could exercise a great deal of independence in policy. They used their freedom to create a model of rule where merchants and bankers had a prominent place, not only during warfare, the all-too-common palace intrigues or disasters, but also in normal times. Merchants and bankers helped the business of governance by collecting taxes, revenue farming, making loans, and taking part in administration, whereas the states helped them by offering lucrative contracts and implicitly recognising their laws and practices.

But the political and geographical environment explains little unless we also consider the social and institutional basis of entrepreneurship in the region. The merchant groups in question were ready to establish diaspora networks in port cities around the Arabian Sea. They conducted extensive and complicated financial operations including bill and insurance, and their bills were acceptable to the distant trading points thanks to the diaspora network.

The book shows in interesting detail how Vaishnavite temples and monasteries became effectively banks, clearing houses, and guarantors of reputation. Community law had great force. The merchants had considerable interest in shipbuilding, which in turn encouraged timber trade. In banking, trading, shipbuilding, and navigation, master-apprentice hierarchies were highly developed, showing how much skills were valued and how skills formed.

The book is well-researched and builds on the author’s deep knowledge of vernacular sources and the regional context. It is business history as business history should be, that is, it succeeds in recreating a whole world around a group of traders, and fills an important gap in Indian economic history scholarship.

One wishes, at the same time, that the author had tried to place the Kachchhi traders more firmly in debates on the 18th century economic transition in southern Asia, and attempted some comparative discussion of trading ‘firms’ in Kachchh and elsewhere in the world. Surely the Europeans operated in the same world, with a very different model of a firm. Did the difference matter to institutional and political change? But, perhaps wisely, Goswami’s book steers clear of dry historiography. Instead, it keeps in mind its readers – who will no doubt find the material presented fascinating and the quality of the narrative superb.

Tirthankar Roy is a professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

source: http://www.thewire.in / The Wire / Home> English> Books / by Tirthankar Roy / July 04th, 2016

How a Khoja Family Helped Wire the Empire: The Chinoys and the Making of Cosmopolitan Capitalism

Mumbai (formerly Bombay), MAHARASHTRA :

Bombay’s Chinoy family pioneered India’s international wireless communication and shaped cosmopolitan capitalism in the colonial era.

The Bombay Garage in Meher Building, near Chowpatty Band Stand in Bombay, was chosen as the family home by Sultan Chinoy, one of Meherally Chinoy’s four sons. Photo: Public domain.

In the crowded economic history of colonial India, the spotlight is often trained on a familiar cast: the Parsis of Bombay – Tatas, Wadias, Godrejs; the Marwari financial giants of Calcutta like the Birlas; and Hindu industrial houses. These communities unquestionably shaped the contours of Indian capitalism. Yet this focus obscures the contributions of other groups who played pivotal roles in connecting India to global circuits of technology, finance and communication.

One such story is that of the Chinoys, a Khoja Ismaili Muslim business family from Bombay. Their rise from the China trade to the helm of India’s international wireless communication network illuminates a distinctive moment in India’s economic history – one in which indigenous capital, imperial technological ambition and flexible, cross-community partnerships came together to produce what we may call cosmopolitan capitalism.

This story not only unsettles the notion that Gujarati Muslim traders were confined to Indian Ocean commerce; it shows how local entrepreneurial families could position themselves at the centre of the empire’s most advanced technological systems.

The Chinoys: a family emerges

Like many Bombay merchant families, the Chinoys began in maritime trade. Their patriarch, Meherally Chinoy, started in the mid-nineteenth century as an apprentice to the Khoja merchant prince Jairazbhoy Peerbhoy. Through repeated voyages to China and Japan, he built a reputation for commercial acumen and established both capital and credibility. His sons consolidated and expanded this base.

By the 1920s, the family firm – Fazalbhoy Meherally (F.M.) Chinoy & Co. – had diversified into wheat, pearls, kerosene, postal contracts, cinema exhibition and, most famously, the Bombay Garage, one of India’s earliest and most successful motor car agencies.

Diversification, community networks and political visibility placed the Chinoys among Bombay’s prominent business families. They sat on the Municipal Corporation, held the Sheriff’s office and participated in legislative bodies. This broad civic footprint would soon prove crucial when new technological horizons opened.

The opportunity of empire: wireless communication

By the early twentieth century, the British Empire faced a strategic challenge: the submarine cable network, long considered the Empire’s “nervous system”, was overstretched. Radio communication offered a faster and cheaper alternative. The Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company proposed in 1910 an ambitious ‘Imperial Wireless Chain’ linking London to its colonies through long-wave radio. Yet Britain hesitated. Monopolistic power for a private company raised political alarms, and various government committees stalled progress.

The late Meherally M. Chinoy, who began by acquiring the licence for Shell, and the late Fazulbhoy M. Chinoy, one of Meherally Chinoy’s four sons, who was in the automative business in Bombay. Photo: Public domain.

Meanwhile, the Government of India – more pragmatic and less suspicious of private enterprise – was open to experimentation, provided the enterprise was Indian-led and financially sound. Into this space stepped the Chinoys.

In 1921, Sultan Chinoy travelled to England to negotiate with the Marconi Company and secure rights for India. It was a bold move; a single Bombay firm seeking to collaborate with one of the world’s pre-eminent technology companies was far from routine. But the Chinoys had two advantages: capital and credibility. Marconi demanded stringent terms, including a steep price for patents and proof that at least half the investment would be raised in India.

Understanding that they needed support beyond their own family, the Chinoys assembled a board that looked like a snapshot of Bombay’s commercial elite: the Parsi industrialists Cusrow and Ness Wadia, the Hindu financier Sir Purshottamdas Thakurdas, and the respected Muslim leader Ibrahim Rahimtoola, among others.

This coalition reassured the colonial state that the venture was both financially stable and politically broad-based. The resulting company, the Indian Radio Telegraph Company (IRTC), represented one of the most ambitious examples of cross-community capitalist cooperation in the late Raj.

Beam wireless comes to India

In 1925, the IRTC secured a ten-year licence from the Government of India. But just as the long-wave system was ready to proceed, Marconi announced a breakthrough: shortwave or “beam” wireless, capable of transmitting messages 95% cheaper and three times as fast. The IRTC pivoted immediately, abandoning the long-wave model in favour of the beam system. By 1927, the India–England beam service opened to great fanfare.

Within a week, message traffic exceeded expectations; within a year, the company handled millions of words of international communication. Beam wireless rapidly undermined the older cable telegraph companies, leading to a merger in 1932.

The new entity, the Indian Radio and Cable Communications Co. (IRCC), managed virtually all of India’s external traffic. In short order, an Indian-led company had assumed control of India’s most sensitive international communication infrastructure.

The IRTC succeeded because the Chinoys excelled at uniting Parsi, Hindu and Muslim capitalists, ensuring political legitimacy and financial strength. The brothers also recognised that mastery of cutting-edge communication technology would give Indian business unprecedented leverage.

Bombay was a major centre for the Khilafat movement, and many Muslim merchants faced financial ruination because of their association with the pan-Islamic movement. The Chinoys, however, stayed away from politics generally and the movement specifically, and prospered. The Khilafat movement was seen as a threat by the empire.

The Chinoys also led the Indian Broadcasting Company (IBC), launched alongside the IRTC. But while beam wireless thrived, the IBC collapsed. The reasons were structural. The government could not agree on the scale and scope of broadcasting, the sector required heavy infrastructure investment. Besides, the company was undercapitalised.

By 1930, it was liquidated; by 1936, its successor became All India Radio. Yet even this failure generated influence. Sir Rahimtoola Chinoy became president of the All India Radio Merchants’ Association, a powerful industry group, positioning the family at the centre of radio trade and regulation.

The legacy of cosmopolitan capitalism

The wireless story reveals a great deal about Bombay’s business world. In an era of rising nationalism and sharpening communal boundaries, major commercial projects still relied on inter-communal coalitions. The IRTC’s leadership – Khoja Muslim entrepreneurs partnering with Parsi industrialists and Hindu financiers – represented an economic cosmopolitanism that was both pragmatic and visionary.

The Chinoys used this moment not simply to participate in imperial networks but to shape them. Their stewardship of India’s international communication system lasted until 1947, when the newly independent state nationalised the IRCC. By then, they had already secured their place among the country’s leading capitalists and public figures, holding senior positions in banks, municipal bodies and national economic delegations.

The Chinoys’ story disrupts familiar narratives of Indian capitalism. Gujarati Muslim traders were not merely marginal or ocean-oriented merchants; they were capable of driving technological transformation at the very heart of colonial infrastructure. Their story underscores how families could convert commercial networks, political relationships and technological foresight into durable economic power.

For readers interested in the full archival study and the complete analytical argument, the original research article is available in Indian Economic and Social History Review.

Danish Khan is a historian and journalist based in London. His DPhil thesis is under contract to be published by Cambridge University Press.

source: http://www.thewire.in / The Wire / Home> Analysis> History / by Danish Khan / November 26th, 2025