Tag Archives: Indian Muslim History

Zohran Mamdani’s New York win revives a forgotten history — of Gujarati Muslim cosmopolitanism

GUJARAT / UGANDA / New York, U.S.A :

From Mughal ports to Dutch wars to Bombay’s merchant dynasties, Gujarati Muslims once shaped the Indian Ocean world — long before one of their descendants took New York.

File photo of Zohran Mamdani | Reuters 2025

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What You Need to Know

Zohran Mamdani’s election highlights a forgotten Indian Muslim cosmopolitanism. Historically, Gujarati Muslim communities dominated Indian Ocean trade, challenging European powers and fostering diverse business relationships. Later, groups like the Khojas adapted through “corporate Islam” (jamaats), becoming powerful economic forces globally. This rich, diverse history is increasingly overshadowed by modern religious nationalism.

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Having delivered speeches in Gujarati, Bengali, Arabic, Hindi, Luganda, and Spanish, Mamdani is a reflection of a long-forgotten Indian Muslim cosmopolitanism. The Gujarati Muslim communities he descends from once challenged the Dutch for hegemony in Indonesia; poured money into schools, hospitals, and printing presses from Japan to Arabia; and helped the British Empire consolidate its grip over Africa. To this day, that Indian Muslim history still echoes — in high-end London auction houses as much as in the working-class boroughs of New York.


The election of Zohran Mamdani as Mayor of New York last week has struck a surprising chord in the world’s media — especially considering he is technically the head of just one American city’s administration. But the buzz around this young Indian-origin Muslim, an avowed democratic socialist, is a ripple in a much older ocean.

Gujaratis in the Indian Ocean

This column began with a rather innocuous tweet pointing out that Mamdani’s multilingualism would have made him a fortune in the early modern Southeast Asian spice trade. As of writing, it has racked up over one million views and 54,000 likes — and it’s a pretty accurate reflection of what propelled Gujarati Muslims to international trade superstardom in the first place.

In her paper ‘Gujarat’s Trade with South East Asia (16th and 17th centuries)’, historian Ruby Maloni describes the great port of Khambhat in Gujarat as having “stretched out two arms — one towards Aden, the other towards Malacca.” While Banias were especially prominent in East Africa and the Persian Gulf at the time, Gujarati Muslim merchants dominated the Malacca trade, conveying relatively cheap block-print textiles from manufactories in Ahmedabad deep into Southeast Asia to trade for spices.

The most prominent among these merchants effectively formed ‘dynasties’ closely linked to the Mughal court, among others. But there was also a strong aspect of caste-based collective organisation, paralleling that of Hindu and Jain Gujaratis.

Nowhere was this more evident than in Surat, perhaps the most impressive port on India’s west coast. Its multilingual babble included Gujarati, Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Dutch, English, and Portuguese. Certainly, there were clear distinctions between caste and religious groups, and within their communities Gujarati merchants — Hindu and Muslim alike — could be quite rigid. At the same time, in interpersonal and business relationships, their shared Gujarati heritage encouraged cosmopolitan attitudes.

Historian Jawaid Akhtar offers several examples in his paper ‘The Culture of Mercantile Communities in Mughal Times.’ In Surat, Armenian merchants were in business with Parsis and Muslims; Vaishnavite Bhatias, despite a taboo against crossing the ocean, jointly owned cargo and ships with Muslims. Akhtar cites documentary evidence of Bania men adopting Muslim practices such as offering dowers to their wives. Muslim and Hindu merchants also collectively represented their grievances to Mughal authorities.

On one occasion in 1669, when the Qazi of Surat compelled a Vaishnavite Bania to convert to Islam, nearly 8,000 merchants — apparently of all religions — emigrated to Bharuch in protest against this infringement of their privileges.

Gujarati Muslims quickly identified Europeans as a threat to their trade dominance in Southeast Asia. Maloni notes that Dutch East India Company records mention their difficulties with these merchants, who took them on through price wars and by installing their own candidates as port authorities. It seemed that there was nothing the Dutch could do to prevent Gujarati Muslims from trading. The Sultanate of Johor welcomed ships belonging to the merchant Haji Zahid Beg, who bought tin in flagrant defiance of Dutch embargoes. Other merchants, Maloni writes, hired cargo space on English ships; the spectacularly wealthy merchant Abdul Ghafur of Surat even flew Dutch flags on his own ships. It was only when the Dutch forcibly colonised much of Indonesia that Gujarati Muslims finally lost their grip on Malacca. But by then, new opportunities were already emerging on the horizon.

Khoja Lady | From the album presented to the Princess of Wales by the women of Bombay, featuring 13 full-page watercolours of Indian women by artist Manchershaw Fakirjee Pithawalla (1872-1937) | Wikimedia Commons

The rise of ‘Corporate Islam’

As the Mughal juggernaut began to shake and unravel in the 18th century, the old order of great merchant princes and dynasties started to fall apart. Surat, repeatedly raided by the Maratha king Shivaji, faced growing competition from the East India Company’s new port at Bombay.

Three Gujarati Muslim communities — the Bohras, Memons, and Khojas — who had hitherto been relatively small-time traders, found themselves ideally placed to benefit from the changing political landscape. Zohran Mamdani descends from the last of these.

In his seminal book No Birds of Passage: A History of Gujarati Muslim Business Communities, 1800–1975, historian Michael O’Sullivan notes that these three groups had spread “as far east as Ujjain, as far west as Karachi, as far south as Poona, and as far north as Udaipur… They thus inhabited a territory that was, by the reckoning of an Indian lexicographer in the 1840s, larger than Great Britain and Ireland, with their shared mother tongues [Gujarati] serving as the principal language of business in Central and Western India.”

The Bohras, Memons and Khojas had all converted to Islam around the 15th century, but their social and cultural practices varied drastically. Subgroups were affiliated with various Sunni and Shia sects; some were Ismaili and revered the Aga Khans, while others traced descent by region and worshipped Sufi saints.

What these groups shared, though, was the jamaat —an institution that O’Sullivan describes as a form of “corporate Islam”. Essentially, members of each jamaat shared some resources in common — schools, hospitals, that sort of thing. Particularly wealthy members, who often held senior religious positions, also maintained private family trusts and companies.

What the jamaat ensured, O’Sullivan writes, was a mechanism for organisation, exclusivity, and interpretation, allowing these communities to adapt the changing contours of Islamic practice to an era of globalisation. Jamaats could mobilise capital, human resources, and theological flexibility at a rate few other Indian institutions could match.

Collectively, these Gujarati Muslim jamaats emerged as some of the most powerful Indian economic forces of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Though now outshone in the popular imagination by Parsi and Bania entrepreneurs, Gujarati Muslims similarly negotiated with the Marathas and the British, benefited from the Opium Wars, and switched soon after to manufacturing all sorts of commercial goods, especially in Bombay.

In the 1840s, Gujarati Muslims commissioned pioneering printed texts — in Gujarati — including travelogues and cultural primers for new markets like China. Their growing wealth also funded spectacular mansions, such as those in Sidhpur, now eerily abandoned. It was Gujaratis, perhaps more than any other Indian group, who built the financial infrastructure of the British Raj in East Africa — a migration line from which Zohran Mamdani himself descends.

All of this amounted to a decisive shift in the centre of gravity of Indian Ocean Islam. It was for this reason that the Aga Khan, revered by Ismaili Khojas, moved his seat from Iran to Bombay before Partition.

Sidhpur city in Gujarat | Wikimedia Commons

A cosmopolitanism forgotten

The versions of Islam promoted by Gujarati Muslims absorbed the modernist vocabulary of capital accumulation and inheritance, frequently splintering into new jamaats as they expanded into ever-new markets and cultures.

At the same time, as researcher Danish Khan notes, Gujarati Muslims attained positions of leadership and influence in Bombay well before they had even set foot in the United States of America. “The first Muslim baronet in colonial India,” he writes, “was a Khoja and the first Muslim ICS officer was a Sulaimani Bohra. Badruddin Tyabji and Rahimtoola Sayani were the first two Muslim Presidents of Congress party. Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy presided over the first session of the Muslim League in Karachi.”

But with the rise of pan-Islamic and Hindu nationalism in the early 20th century, the scales swung once again, and mercantile, oceanic histories were overridden by grievances inspired by long-dead inland kings.

Where does the history of Gujarati Muslims fit now? Mamdani’s election is ironic on many levels. In Bombay, once the historic home of the community, a BJP politician declared, in response to Mamdani’s victory in New York, that “We won’t allow any Khan to become mayor.”

The fact is that before and since, the history of Gujarati Muslims has, for all intents and purposes, disappeared into the ever–widening gap between radical Hindutva and radical Islam. Every news cycle, it seems, tears India’s many intertwined histories further apart.

Anirudh Kanisetti is a public historian. He is the author of ‘Lords of Earth and Sea: A History of the Chola Empire’ and the award-winning ‘Lords of the Deccan’. He hosts the Echoes of India and Yuddha podcasts. He tweets @AKanisetti and is on Instagram @anirbuddha.

This article is a part of the ‘Thinking Medieval’ series that takes a deep dive into India’s medieval culture, politics, and history.

(Edited by Prashant Dixit)

source: http://www.theprint.in / The Print / Home> Opinion> The Fine Print / by Anirudh Kanisetti / November 13th, 2025

Review of ‘Another India — The Making of the World’s Largest Muslim Minority, 1947-77’ : The original betrayers

INDIA:

Pratinav Anil argues that policies of the Congress and the Muslim elite ended up hurting Indian Muslims the most.

Muslim devotees praying on the street of Kolkata during the holy month of Ramadan. | Photo Credit: Getty Images/ istock

Unobjective commentators have, in the last decade, perfected the art of highlighting the tribulations of being a Muslim in “Hindu India” without contrasting them with the difficulties the same Muslim faced in “secular India” that supposedly existed before 2014.

Pratinav Anil is perhaps the only modern historian who has gone against this trend to put right the wilful muting of Indian Muslim history. His new book Another India: The Making of the World’s Largest Muslim Minority, 1947–77 is an in-depth analysis of anti-Muslim violence since Independence that exposes the Islamophobic facet of the country the Congress established in August 1947.

In simple terms, the question that Another India seeks to answer is: Was the Congress’s idea of India genuinely secular and based on communal equality? From the facts it lines up, the answer is ‘no’.

Riots and taunts

Not many know that the “most violent Hindu-Muslim conflagration of postcolonial India” was unleashed in 1964 in which a staggering 800,000 Muslims from Bengal were pushed into East Pakistan.

President S. Radhakrishnan visiting Central Calcutta, a predominantly Muslim locality, affected by the January riots. He is seen with the Muslims of the locality (Kalabagan area) on June 30, 1964. | Photo Credit: The Hindu archives

Indeed, it was under the Congress that the derisive “go to Pakistan” taunt was actualised when nearly 2% of the Indian Muslims were sent to Pakistan after being branded infiltrators who had sneaked in to convert Hindus to Islam. Before being expelled, they were dumped in makeshift camps on the border “like herds of cattle”, and forced to “sign papers declaring falsely that they were Pakistanis” when many of them were genuine Indians.

A large number of those who couldn’t be “sent to Pakistan” became the victims of the “riots galore” that dotted Nehru’s rule. The “institutionalised riot system” was so one-sided that Muslims made up 82% of the fatalities and 59% of the injured.

Prepossessed hostility towards Muslims was also the cause of the 1948 police action in Hyderabad which, for Anil, was “a mass pogrom” because it had resulted in the massacre of 40,000 Muslims, the rape of women, loot, arson, desecration of mosques, forcible conversions, and seizure of houses and lands. Nehru hastily suppressed the Sunderlal Report that brought out these facts.

Anil concludes that Nehruvian India was often “an Islamophobic agency” that wore secularism as “a fig leaf” to hide its pro-Hindu bias.

At the historic conference in New Delhi on June 7, 1947, when Lord Mountbatten disclosed Britain’s “partition” plan for India. (left to right) Jawaharlal Nehru, Lord Ismay, Adviser to the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, and M.A. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League. | Photo Credit: The Hindu photo archives

The Ashraf betrayal

But how did the Congress get away with its brazen marginalisation of Muslims? With the help of “nationalist Muslims” and “notables”, says Anil.

The former were mostly Muslim Congressmen who harmed their community by conflating India’s progress with that of the Congress; shielding Congress from criticism by blaming Muslim communalists for Partition, and placing the constitutional protection of the shariah above the community’s political rights.

The “notables” comprised upper-class Muslims (the ashraf) such as mutawallis (custodians of waqf properties), waseeqadars (princely pensioners) and waaqifs (dedicators of properties for waqf) all of whom used their aristocratic agency to feather their nests in the guise of working for the community’s economic development.

A major preoccupation of these patricians was “the preservation of distinctive elements of Muslim culture in a non-Muslim environment.” Backing them to the hilt were the ulama, especially those belonging to the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind which Anil calls a branch of the Congress in all but name.

The “ashrafised” Islam that the ashraf-clergy nexus promoted secured the class interests of the ashrafs and almost totally ignored the plight of common Muslims.

In a scathing attack on the Muslim elite’s obsession with the shariah-based Personal Law, Anil says that it furnished the patriarchs with “a private fiefdom to do as they pleased” without mitigating the community’s “despondent public existence in an Islamophobic society.”

No space for scrutiny

As a consequence, Muslim politics had no room for “trade unions, mass protests, anti-discrimination legislation, and subaltern solidarity” while it had plenty for “high cultural totemic symbols such as the AMU, auqaf, Urdu, and the sharia.” This suited the ruling “Hindu Congress” because a politically empowered non-Hindu group was not in its interest.

Even today the ashraf-clergy alliance prioritises religion and religious symbolism over social cohesion and political participation. If, for instance, ashraf-backed madrasas are fixated on anachronistic medievalism, many clergy-endorsed secular English medium schools controlled by wealthy Muslims promote religious identitarianism by making the skull cap (for boys) and the hijab (for girls) a mandatory part of the uniform.

At a hijab shop. | Photo Credit: Reuters

This self-ghettoisation, which is nothing short of an attempt to discourage the enrolment of non-Muslims in Muslim schools, sustains itself on the fear of the other and has the potential to render Muslim students incapable of living in multi-religious and multi-cultural societies after graduation.

Given this sad state of affairs, Another India couldn’t have come at a better time. Its neoteric narrative is not just a searing exposé of Congress’ betrayal of trustful Muslims who stayed back in India after rejecting Pakistan; it is also an invitation to Indian Muslims to acquire a sense of critical thinking and break free from the serpentine stranglehold of the ashraf-clergy alliance that is hell-bent on denying them the heaven-ordained right to intellectual liberation.

Another India: The Making of the World’s Largest Muslim Minority, 1947-77; Pratinav Anil, Penguin/ Viking, ₹999.

The reviewer is Secretary-General of the Islamic Forum for the Promotion of Moderate Thought.

source: http://www.thehindu.com / The Hindu / Home> Books> Reviews / by A Faizur Rahman / February 04th, 2024